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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a scheme to employ an asymmetric finger-
printing protocol within a client-side embedding distribution frame-
work. The scheme is based on a novel client-side embedding tech-
nique that is able to transmit a binary fingerprint. This enables secure
distribution of personalized decryption keys containing the Buyer’s
fingerprint by means of existing asymmetric protocols, without us-
ing a trusted third party. Simulation results show that the fingerprint
can be reliably recovered by using non-blind decoding, and it is ro-
bust with respect to common attacks. The proposed scheme can be
a valid solution to both customer’s rights and scalability issues in
multimedia content distribution.
Index Terms— Fingerprinting, Buyer-Seller watermarking pro-
tocol, Client-side embedding, secure watermark embedding.
1. INTRODUCTION
The recent proliferation of various platforms for the distribution of
multimedia contents requires the adoption of effective protection
measures for preventing copyright violations. In the most common
case, distribution tracing is made possible by letting the Seller in-
sert a distinct watermark, called a fingerprint, identifying the Buyer,
within any copy of data that is distributed. Whenever an unautho-
rized published content is found, this fingerprint can be used to trace
the author of the illegal redistribution [1, 2, 3].
Existing watermarking techniques for multimedia content pro-
tection have been developed to face two important practical issues.
The customer’s rights problem is due to the fact that the distribu-
tion server should not know the actual fingerprint embedded into the
content, since an accused customer could claim that he/she has been
framed by a malicious seller. To cope with this issue, asymmet-
ric fingerprinting schemes [4] have been proposed: here, only the
buyer has access to the fingerprinted content; however, if the seller
later finds a copy of the content, the buyer can still be identified and
proved guilty. Several such protocols suitable for multimedia con-
tents, referred to as Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocols (BSWP),
exist [5, 6, 7, 8]: a special class include those relying only on mes-
sages exchanged between buyer and seller, without requiring a ded-
icated trusted third party (TTP) [9, 10].
The second issue is related to the system scalability. In a classi-
cal distribution model, adopted also by the BSWP, individually wa-
termarked copies are generated and distributed by the distribution
server to each user. Since both the computational burden due to wa-
termark embedding and the required bandwidth grow linearly with
the number of users, in large-scale systems the server could con-
sume a prohibitive amount of resources. An effective solution to
this problem is provided by client-side embedding [11]: here, the
server distributes the same encrypted copy of the content to all the
clients, along with different client-specific decryption keys allowing
each user to decrypt a slightly different version of the content, bear-
ing a different watermark. Secure client-side embedding methods
suitable for realistic multimedia content have been developed taking
into account spread-spectrum watermarking [12], informed embed-
ding [13], and vector quantization [14].
Although client-side embedding provides an elegant solution to
the system scalability problem, it still suffers of the customer’s rights
problem, since the server has access to the decryption keys that carry
the client-specific watermarks. Some works [15, 16] have proposed
to introduce a TTP managing the distribution of the decryption keys.
However, such a TTP can quickly become overloaded, thus hinder-
ing the advantages of client-side embedding. To the best of our
knowledge, there is no existing solution that incorporates the afore-
mentioned techniques into an asymmetric fingerprinting protocol,
solving both the customer’s rights problem and the scalability issue.
In this paper, we propose a simple scheme to exploit existing
secure asymmetric fingerprinting protocols within a client-side em-
bedding distribution framework. Namely, we modify the client-side
embedding technique proposed in [12] so that it can be used to reli-
ably transmit a binary fingerprint, which enables the secure distribu-
tion of decryption keys by means of existing TTP-free buyer-seller
watermarking protocols. Thanks to the used protocol, the server can
distribute personalized decryption keys without knowing the actual
fingerprint embedded in each key, which eliminates the need of a
TTP. At the same time, since the size of a decryption key is much
lower than the size of a multimedia content, and a single key can
be used for multiple contents, the complexity of running an existing
TTP-free buyer-seller protocol, like e.g. that in [9], for the distribu-
tion of the keys is still reasonable.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Watermarking Model
Given a vector x = [x1, x2, . . . , xM ], representing either the orig-
inal host signal samples or, more generally, a set of features of the
host signal, and some to-be-hidden information, represented as a bi-
nary vector b = [b1, b2, . . . , bL], an embedder inserts the watermark
code b into the host signal to produce a watermarked signal y, usu-
ally making use of a secret key sk to control some parameters of the
embedding process and allow the watermark recovery only to autho-
rized users. It is often useful to describe the embedding function by
introducing a watermarking signalw, so that the watermarked signal
can be expressed as y = x+w.
2.2. Homomorphic Cryptosystems
A cryptosystem is said to be homomorphic with respect to an oper-
ation ? if there exists an operator φ(·, ·) such that for any two plain
messages m1 and m2, we have:
φ(Jm1K, Jm2K) = Jm1 ? m2K (1)
where J·K denotes the encryption operator. Homomorphic encryp-
tion allows to perform a set of operations by working on encrypted
data. In particular, an additively homomorphic cryptosystem usually
maps an addition in the plaintext domain to a multiplication in the
ciphertext domain. Given two plaintexts m1 and m2, the follow-
ing equalities are then satisfied: Jm1K · Jm2K = Jm1 + m2K and,
as a consequence, JmKa = JamK where a is a public integer. Ad-
ditively homomorphic cryptosystems allow then to perform in the
encrypted domain additions, subtractions and multiplications with a
known (non-encrypted) value (but not division, since it could lead to
non integer values), thus providing a way of applying any linear op-
erator in the encrypted domain. A well known additively homomor-
phic asymmetric encryption scheme was proposed by Paillier [17].
2.3. Asymmetric Fingerprinting
In asymmetric fingerprinting [4] the Buyer first commits to a secret
that only he/she knows (registration phase), then Buyer and Seller
follow a protocol (named Buyer-Seller watermarking protocol) af-
ter which only the Buyer receives a copy of the watermarked work.
However, if the copy is illegally distributed, the Seller can identify
the Buyer from whom the copy originated, and prove it to a Judge
by using a proper dispute resolution protocol.
A fundamental building block of asymmetric fingerprinting is
a functionality that allows Seller and Buyer to jointly perform wa-
termark embedding, in such a way that the original content x is a
private input of the Seller, whereas the fingerprint data b and thus
the watermark w are a private input of the Buyer.
2.4. LUT-based Secure Embedding
In the secure embedding proposed by Celik et al. in [18, 12], a dis-
tribution server generates a long-term master encryption look-up ta-
ble E of size T , whose entries, denoted by E(0),E(1), . . . ,E(T −
1), are i.i.d. random variables following a Gaussian distribution
N (0, σE). The LUT E will be used to encrypt the content to be
distributed to the KU clients. Next, for the k-th client, the server
generates a personalized watermark LUT Wk whose entries follow a
Gaussian distribution N (0, σW ), and builds a personalized decryp-
tion LUT Dk by combining componentwise the master encryption
LUT E and the watermark LUT Wk:
Dk(t) = −E(t) +Wk(t) (2)
for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1. The personalized decryption LUTs are then
transmitted once to each client over a secure channel. It is worth
noting that the generation of the LUTs is carried out just once at the
setup phase.
Driven by the content dependent key sk, a set of M ×R values
tih in the range [0, T − 1] is generated, where 0 ≤ i ≤ M − 1,
0 ≤ h ≤ R − 1. Each of the M content features xi is encrypted
by adding R entries of the encryption LUT identified by the indexes
(ti0, . . . , ti(R−1)), obtaining the encrypted feature ci as follows:
ci = xi +
R−1∑
h=0
E(tih). (3)
Joint decryption and watermarking is accomplished by reconstruct-
ing with the content dependent key sk the same sequence of indexes
tih and by adding R entries of the decryption LUT Dk to each en-
crypted feature ci:
yk,i = ci +
R−1∑
h=0
Dk(tih) = xi +
R−1∑
h=0
Wk(tih) = xi + wk,i (4)
where the i-th watermark component is given as the sum ofR entries
of the LUT Wk. The result of this operation is the watermarked
content yk = x+wk identifying the k-th user.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
The key idea of the proposed method is that the decryption LUT in
(2) can be alternatively seen as the negative version of the encryption
LUT watermarked by a proper signalW corresponding to the water-
marking LUT. Hence, existing buyer-seller watermarking protocols
can be used to securely distribute personalized decryption LUTs in
such a way that the server does not have access to plaintext versions
of those decryption LUTs. However, since existing TTP-free proto-
cols require the buyer to be identified by a unique binary fingerprint,
the watermarking LUT must be properly modified so as to embed
a binary message into the content and guarantee that the embedded
message can be reliably decoded from a possibly modified water-
marked content.
3.1. Distribution of Personalized Decryption LUTs
Let us assume that the k-th user is identified by the L-bit finger-
print bk. The fingerprint is encoded using a binary antipodal mod-
ulation, yielding the to be transmitted message mk, where mk,l =
σW (2bk,l − 1), 0 ≤ l ≤ L − 1. Hence, the watermarking LUT of
the k-th user is obtained as
Wk = Gmk (5)
where G is a T × L encoding matrix. Namely, G can be thought
as the generator matrix of a linear block code over the set of real
numbers [19, 20].
Several choices are possible forG. A really simple solution is to
use a repetition code, i.e.,G has only one entry equal to one for each
row and approximately T/L entries equal to one for each column.
Another solution is to generate the elements of G as i.i.d. Gaussian
variables with zero mean and variance 1/L.
Since the encoding is linear, the personalized decryption LUT
Dk can be obtained in a secure way by using a simple protocol
based on an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. Let us assume
that by executing a secure buyer-seller protocol like the one de-
scribed in [10] the Server obtains an encryption of the Client’s fin-
gerprint JbkK, encrypted with the Client’s public key, together with
a proper proof of identity. Thanks to the homomorphic properties
of the cryptosystem, the Server can compute the encrypted message
as Jmk,lK = Jbk,lK2σW JσW K−1. In a similar way, each entry of the
Client’s personalized LUT can be directly computed in the encrypted
domain as
JDk(j)K = JEk(j)K−1 L−1∏
l=0
Jmk,lKG(j,l). (6)
Finally, the Server can send the encrypted LUT JDkK to the Client,
who decrypts it with his/her private key obtaining
Dk = −Ek +Gmk. (7)
As done in [10], the Server can randomize bk,l in the encrypted do-
main in order to prevent the Client from removing the watermark
from Dk.
3.2. Watermark Decoding
The decryption operation described in (4) can be modeled by adding
to the encrypted signal the product of the decryption LUT D and a
proper binary matrix T defined according to the sequence of indexes
tih, i.e.,
y = c+ TDk = x+ TWk (8)
where T is a M × T binary matrix defined as
T(i, j) =
{
1 tih = j, h = 0, . . . , R− 1
0 otherwise.
(9)
As a result, the watermark associated to the kth user is given by
w = TWk = TGmk = G˜mk (10)
that is, the watermark is equal to the message mk encoded by the
linear block code defined by the M × L generator matrix G˜ = TG.
Since the scheme is asymmetric, the decoder does not know the
messages mk, so it can not employ a correlation detector as in [12].
Instead, the detector obtains an estimated fingerprint bˆk and verifies
whether it matches with a recorded Client, using the proof of identity
provided by the underlying buyer-seller protocol. Let us assume that
the watermark decoder receives a copy of the watermarked signal
corrupted by an additive noise, i.e., the received signal is
y′ = y + n = x+ G˜mk + n. (11)
When the original signal is available at the decoder, its interfer-
ence can be removed and decoding can be performed on the signal
y′′ = y′ − x = G˜mk + n. Otherwise, blind decoding can be ob-
tained by directly using the received signal y′ and considering x as
an additional noise term.
Several decoding strategies can be considered to recover the
Client’s fingerprint bˆk. In this paper, we will consider the Matched
Filter (MF) decoder
bˆk = sgn
{
G˜Ty′′
}
(12)
and the Pseudo-Inverse (PI) decoder
bˆk = sgn
{
(G˜T G˜)−1G˜Ty′′
}
. (13)
MF and PI decoders are based on standard suboptimal receiver com-
monly adopted in digital communications. Namely, the PI decoder
corresponds to zero-forcing equalization followed by hard decision.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
For the experimental validation of the proposed technique, we have
simulated a system performing client-side embedding on digital im-
ages. We have considered a dataset of 20 gray scale uncompressed
8 bit images, each having resolution 1024× 1024. For each image,
the signal x has been obtained by applying a 8 × 8 discrete cosine
transform (DCT) to the image and taking 4 DCT coefficients for
each 8 × 8 block, corresponding to the coefficients between the 7th
and 10th positions according to the zig-zag ordering used by JPEG
standard. This resulted in a vector x of 216 components.
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Fig. 1. FER performance of different encoding a decoding strategies:
(a) nonblind decoding; (b) blind decoding.
Each image has been encrypted by using an encryption LUT E
with power σ2E = 10
6. After adding the elements of E to the se-
lected DCT coefficients, the images have been reconstructed by us-
ing an inverse block DCT and pixel values have been mapped to 8 bit
values by applying rounding and a modulo 256 operation. An analo-
gous sequence of operations have been performed when decrypting
the images with the decryption LUT D. The use of the modulo op-
eration guarantees that the encryption is perfectly reversible as long
as D = −E. However, when D = −E+W, some pixels may ex-
ceed the range [0, 255] in the watermarked image and wrap around
after the modulo operation. In order to prevent this problem, the
histogram of each image has been compressed between 2 and 253.
Moreover, possible wrong pixels in the reconstructed image are iden-
tified by comparing the value of each pixel with the value of a 5× 5
median filtered version of the image, and pixels whose value differ
by more than 192 from the median filtered image are replaced by the
corresponding value in the median filtered image.
In all experiments, the LUT size was set to T = 216 and R =
4 LUT entries are added to encrypt each element. We simulated
embedding and subsequent decoding of a 128 binary fingerprint.
Two encoding strategies were considered, repetition coding (RC)
and i.i.d. random Gaussian coding (GC), as described in Section 3.
As to decoding, we considered MF and PI decoding. For each im-
−20 −15 −10 −5 0
10−2
10−1
100
WNR
FE
R
 
 
RC − MF
RC − PI
GC − MF
GC −  PI
Fig. 2. FER performance of different encoding a decoding strategies
in the presence of AWGN attack, considering nonblind decoding.
age, 100 independent tests were performed by randomly generating
different encryption LUTs, different fingerprints, and different en-
coding matrices G. This yielded 20 × 100 = 2000 transmitted
fingerprints and 2000 × 128 = 256000 transmitted bits for each
experiment.
The decoding performance has been evaluated by measuring
the fingerprint error rate (FER), corresponding to the ratio of erro-
neously decoded fingerprints to the overall transmitted fingerprints.
In order to evaluate the quality of the watermarked image with re-
spect to the original image, we also measured the mean structural
similarity (MSSIM) index [21].
A first set of experiments considered the decoding performance
in the absence of attacks, by testing different watermarking powers
corresponding to values σ2W ∈ [10−5, 103]. Fig. 1-(a) shows the de-
coding performance in the nonblind case. The results show that for
σ2W > 10
−2 all the strategies achieve a good fingerprint decoding
performance, with GC being slightly better than RC and PI decoding
being slightly better than MF decoding. Namely, for σ2W = 10
−2
GC using PI decoding is able to correctly decode more than 95%
of the fingerprints. Interestingly, some errors appears for σ2W ≥ 102
due to the fact that the large watermarking power causes several wrap
around errors in the reconstructed image. Fig. 1-(b) shows the de-
coding performance in the blind case. As expected, the performance
is significatively worse than in the nonblind case. Namely, all strate-
gies, except RC using MF decoding, can correctly decode more than
90% of the fingerprints only when σ2W ≥ 10. As to the effect of
the watermarking strength on the reconstructed images, for σ2W = 1
the value of MSSIM index in the worst case is 0.9941 for RC and
0.9949 for GC, meaning that when using nonblind decoding the pro-
posed method can achieve very good decoding performance without
significantly affecting the quality of the watermarked image.
A second set of experiments were conducted in the presence of
attacks, for σ2W = 1. For brevity, only the results obtained by the
nonblind decoder are presented. The watermarked images were ei-
ther corrupted by AWGN or compressed using the JPEG standard.
In the first case, we considered watermark-to-noise ratios (WNRs)
in the range [−20, 0], where we define WNR = 10 log10 Rσ
2
W
σ2
N
, be-
ing σ2N the variance of the additive noise. In the second case, we
considered different JPEG quality factors (QF), from 10 to 100.
Fig. 2 shows the performance of nonblind decoding in the pres-
ence of AWGN attack. With the exception of RC using MF decod-
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Fig. 3. FER performance of different encoding a decoding strategies
in the presence of JPEG attack, considering nonblind decoding.
ing, all the strategies achieve very similar performance and guaran-
tee almost error-free decoding of the fingerprint for WNR > −15,
which demonstrates a great robustness in the presence of AWGN.
ForWNR = −16, the average MSSIM index value after the AWGN
attack is 0.5599 for both RC and GC, indicating that the image is so
degraded as to be of no practical value.
Fig. 3 shows the performance of nonblind decoding in the pres-
ence of JPEG attack. Similarly to the AWGN case, all the strategies
achieve very similar performance except RC using MF decoding. In
general, the proposed scheme can withstand JPEG compression with
a quality factor as low as 40 without showing significant decoding
errors and can still correctly decode about 20% of the fingerprints
for a quality factor equal to 20. For a quality factor equal to 20, the
values of MSSIM index after the JPEG attack range from 0.7960 to
0.9268, with an average value of 0.8826, indicating that most of the
images have to be largely degraded in order to impede the correct
decoding of the fingerprint.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel client-side embedding tech-
nique enabling the distribution of multimedia content through an
asymmetric fingerprint protocol. The main idea behind the proposed
scheme is that existing asymmetric protocols, that do not require a
dedicated trusted third party, can be used to securely exchange the
personalized decryption keys needed by client-side embedding. In
order to make this approach feasible, the Buyer’s binary fingerprint
is encoded in the personalized decryption key via linear block cod-
ing, which can be securely implemented at the Seller’s side by using
homomorphic encryption. Since the size of a decryption key is much
lower than the size of a multimedia content, and a single key can
be used for multiple contents, the proposed solution offers signifi-
cant advantages with respect to a traditional server-side asymmetric
protocol. Moreover, simulation results show that the embedded fin-
gerprint can be reliably decoded from the watermarked content, even
when using low watermarking power and in the presence of common
attacks, like additive Gaussian noise and JPEG compression. The
proposed scheme can offer a valid solution in multimedia content
distribution, since it is able to protect both seller’s and customer’s
rights, and, at the same time, it effectively solves scalability issues.
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